Corporate Law & M&A

Shareholder disputes in a GmbH: exclusion, dismissal, redemption and exit

A shareholder suddenly receives less information. Management takes decisions without consultation. Profit distributions are blocked. A shareholders’ meeting escalates. Or two shareholders each holding 50 per cent can no longer agree on key decisions.

A difference of opinion can then quickly turn into a conflict that affects not only those involved but the entire business. This is precisely when the right sequence matters. Anyone who hastily tries to exclude a shareholder, dismiss management or force through resolutions can create considerable legal and economic risks.

A shareholder dispute does not begin with the question of who is right. The first thing to clarify is: which rights, majorities and economic levers exist, and what outcome is to be achieved?

Define the goal first

Not every shareholder dispute has to end with one party leaving. Before taking legal action, it should be clarified whether the cooperation is to continue, only management is to change, one shareholder is to be bought out or a complete economic separation is to be achieved.

  • Is the cooperation to continue in principle?
  • Is only management or the allocation of responsibilities to change?
  • Is one of the shareholders to leave the business?
  • Is a complete unbundling or sale the better solution economically?

Anyone who actually wants a share purchase or an amicable separation should not hastily provoke a years-long exclusion dispute. Conversely, a shareholder whose information, voting or administrative rights are acutely impaired should not rely on an informal solution for too long.

The first review: articles of association and side agreements

In hardly any corporate conflict is the individual contractual position as important. The following in particular must be reviewed:

  • Articles of association and subsequent amendments
  • Shareholder, pooling and voting agreements
  • Rules of procedure and catalogues of transactions requiring consent
  • Managing directors’ service agreements
  • Financing agreements and shareholder loans
  • Non-compete and confidentiality provisions
  • Pre-emption, purchase, redemption and assignment clauses
  • Termination, withdrawal and deadlock provisions
  • Severance clauses, valuation procedures and arbitration agreements

The articles of association are central, especially for a compulsory redemption. Section 34 of the German Limited Liability Companies Act (GmbHG) only permits redemption to the extent that it is allowed by the articles. Redemption without consent additionally requires that its conditions were already laid down in the articles before the shareholder concerned acquired the share.

In a shareholder dispute, the articles of association are not a formality. They often determine which side has the stronger legal and economic lever.

Information, resolutions and management

1. Securing information

Anyone wishing to conduct or avoid a shareholder dispute first needs a reliable information base. Section 51a GmbHG obliges the managing directors to provide every shareholder, on request and without undue delay, with information on the company’s affairs and to allow inspection of its books and records.

A refusal is only possible under narrow conditions: there must be a concern that the shareholder will use the information for purposes unrelated to the company and thereby cause the company or an affiliated company a not insignificant disadvantage. In addition, the refusal requires a shareholder resolution. Under Section 51a (3) GmbHG, the articles cannot deviate from these information rights. Judicial enforcement is governed by Section 51b GmbHG.

In practice, annual financial statements, management accounts, bank documents, managing directors’ remuneration, contracts with shareholders or related parties, shareholder loans, key customer and supplier contracts and business plans can be particularly relevant.

2. Preparing the shareholders’ meeting and majorities

Many shareholder disputes begin not in court but at the shareholders’ meeting. Under Section 47 GmbHG, decisions are generally taken by a majority of the votes cast, unless the law or the articles provide otherwise. Before a contentious meeting, competence, authority to convene, form and notice period of the invitation, agenda, quorums, majorities, representation, voting rights, possible prohibitions on voting and the minutes should be reviewed.

For contentious items, the outcome must not be calculated solely on the basis of shareholding percentages. Statutory or contractual prohibitions on voting can change the distribution of votes, especially for resolutions on breaches of duty, legal disputes or measures against a shareholder. Whether a prohibition on voting applies must be checked separately for the specific item.

3. Challenging defective shareholder resolutions

Not every defective resolution is automatically invalid. Under GmbH law, a distinction must be made between voidable and void resolutions. What legal consequence a defect has and which procedure is to be used against it depends on the nature and seriousness of the defect.

Unlike the Stock Corporation Act, the GmbHG contains no general statutory one-month deadline for challenging GmbH shareholder resolutions. Case law nevertheless generally requires prompt action; in addition, provisions in the articles may need to be observed. Invitation, agenda, majority, prohibitions on voting and the content of the resolution should therefore be reviewed immediately after a contentious meeting.

In the law on defective resolutions, waiting is generally the wrong strategy. The type of action, deadline, correct parties and possible consequences of implementation should be clarified immediately.

4. Dismissing managing directors

If a shareholder is also a managing director, three legal positions must be considered separately. Section 38 (1) GmbHG generally provides that the appointment of a managing director can be revoked at any time, without prejudice to claims under existing contracts. Under Section 38 (2) GmbHG, the articles can restrict dismissal to good cause.

Legal positionMeaning
Shareholder statusShareholding, voting and financial rights
Office of managing directorCorporate office and power of representation
Managing director’s service agreementContractual service relationship, remuneration and other contractual rights

Dismissal neither automatically ends the managing director’s service agreement nor the shareholder status. Depending on the aim of the separation, termination or cancellation of the service agreement, garden leave, revocation of powers of attorney, adjustment of bank authorisations, securing access and documents, and the filing with the commercial register may also be required.

Separating from a co-shareholder

5. Redemption of the share

Redemption (Einziehung) is a particularly sharp instrument. Under Section 34 GmbHG, it requires a basis in the articles. Before a resolution, the ground for redemption, the required majority, possible prohibitions on voting, proportionality, severance and financeability in particular must be reviewed.

Capital maintenance is of particular importance. Section 34 (3) GmbHG expressly leaves Section 30 (1) GmbHG unaffected. It must therefore be checked whether the severance obligation associated with the departure is compatible with the capital maintenance rules. A redemption is not a simple “expulsion” but an intervention under corporate law with considerable follow-on issues.

6. Compulsory assignment as an alternative

Depending on the articles, instead of extinguishing the share, it may be provided that the shareholder concerned must transfer their share to a co-shareholder, another shareholder or a third party. A compulsory assignment can have advantages over redemption if the acquirer, purchase price financing and future shareholder structure are to be shaped deliberately. This, too, requires a sound basis in the articles.

7. Exclusion for good cause

If there is no suitable redemption clause, judicial exclusion for good cause may be considered under narrow conditions. Exclusion is a last resort. A mere personal breakdown in relations is not automatically sufficient. Breaches of duty related to the company, the attribution of the causes of the conflict and less drastic means in particular must be examined.

For the two-person GmbH, the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) clarified in its judgment of 11 July 2023 (II ZR 116/21) that a shareholder can, under the conditions described there, pursue the exclusion of their co-shareholder by way of a derivative action (actio pro socio). The exclusion takes effect when the judgment granting it becomes final; the earlier case law, which generally made exclusion dependent on prior payment of the severance, was abandoned in this respect.

8. 50/50 GmbH and deadlock

In a two-person GmbH with 50 per cent each, a fundamental conflict can paralyse the company. Neither side alone has the required majority. Management, appropriation of profits, financing or strategic decisions can come to a standstill.

A deadlock is not automatically a ground for exclusion, however. What matters are the articles, the causes of the conflict, breaches of duty and the less drastic solutions available. Options include in particular a share purchase, mediation, deadlock mechanisms in the articles, a reorganisation of management, proceedings on defective resolutions, an exclusion action or, as the most extreme scenario, the dissolution or realisation of the joint structure.

In a 50/50 conflict, the central question is not only: who wins? What matters is how the company’s ability to act and its value are protected until a solution is found.

9. Minority shareholders and majority power

A minority shareholder cannot prevent many resolutions alone. That does not mean they are without rights. Alongside the mandatory information rights, rights to attend, participate and review resolutions, statutory or contractual minority rights, prohibitions on voting and the fiduciary duty under corporate law can be relevant.

Conversely, the majority may not use its voting power detached from the law, the articles and the fiduciary duty. A majority means the power to shape, not legal arbitrariness.

Fiduciary duty, claims and interim relief

10. Fiduciary duty as a limit on formal rights

Shareholders are subject to fiduciary duties under corporate law. Not everything that appears possible according to the wording of the articles or on the basis of a voting majority may be enforced in every conflict situation without regard for the company and the co-shareholders.

Fiduciary duties can become significant in particular when existential resolutions are blocked, confidential information is used, in competitive situations, with business opportunities of the company, abuse of the majority and the exercise of voting rights. Their content and intensity depend on the structure of the company, the size of the shareholding and the specific conflict.

11. Breaches of duty and damages

A shareholder dispute is not only about whether someone stays in the company. Often there are claims for breaches of duty, for example in the case of unjustified payments, excessive managing director remuneration, competing activities, diversion of business opportunities, private use of company assets or breaches of management and fiduciary duties.

Before enforcement, it must be clarified who is entitled to the claim, who may assert it, which resolution is required and whether the shareholders concerned are subject to a prohibition on voting. Claims of the company must not simply be equated with personal claims of a shareholder.

12. Interim relief

Shareholder disputes can come to a head within a few days. Where measures under corporate law are imminent or have already been initiated, it must be examined whether interim relief to secure a legal position is necessary and admissible.

This can be relevant, for example, for meetings called at short notice, the threatened implementation of contested resolutions or changes that are difficult to reverse. The requirements depend heavily on the measure, the urgency and the threatened impairment. Where a decision would in effect anticipate the main proceedings, particularly high requirements generally apply.

The economic exit

13. Amicable separation

Not every shareholder dispute should be fought through to a judgment. Often the economically viable solution is: one leaves, one stays. A robust separation agreement must, however, govern more than the purchase price.

  • Purchase and notarised assignment of the shares
  • Purchase price or severance and valuation mechanism
  • Payment terms, security and financing
  • Shareholder loans, guarantees and other financing
  • Managing director position and service agreement
  • Non-compete obligations, confidentiality and know-how
  • Mutual claims and pending court proceedings
  • Use of company name, trademarks, domains and other assets
  • Tax implementation and allocation of costs

14. Severance and business valuation

The severance a departing shareholder receives depends largely on the reason for leaving and the provisions of the articles. If the articles contain a severance clause, it must be checked whether it is valid and how it applies in the specific case. If there is no effective limitation, the actual economic value of the shareholding becomes particularly important.

The valuation may need to take into account in particular earning power, financial liabilities, hidden reserves, shareholder loans, current earnings trends and future planning. Where severance clauses deviate significantly from the actual value of the share, a legal review of validity and adjustment is required.

15. Planning the shareholder separation for tax purposes

An exit that works under corporate law is not automatically economically optimal. Share sale, redemption, severance, debt waiver and the treatment of shareholder loans can have different tax consequences. Tax structuring should therefore already be included in the negotiations on the separation, not only after the settlement has been concluded.

Typical mistakes in shareholder disputes

  • Escalating without a goal: Lawyers’ letters, dismissal or criminal complaints are used before the economic goal has been defined.
  • Reviewing the articles incompletely: Redemption, quorums, pre-emption rights, arbitration and deadlock provisions are overlooked.
  • Mixing up legal positions: Dismissal, service agreement and shareholder status are mistakenly treated as one.
  • Preparing the meeting with formal defects: Invitation, agenda, majority, representation or prohibitions on voting are not properly checked.
  • Challenging resolutions too late: A possibly voidable resolution is initially accepted.
  • Not using information rights: Breaches of duty or company value are negotiated without reliable documents.
  • Considering redemption without financing: Severance and capital maintenance are only considered after the resolution.
  • Treating deadlock with majority logic: A strategy is pursued although neither side has the required majority.
  • Confusing the claimant: Claims of the company are treated like personal claims of a shareholder.
  • Ignoring tax and financing: Exit and severance are negotiated without a tax and financial implementation concept.
  • Losing sight of the business: The conflict damages operations, employee retention, financing and customer relationships.

Seven questions in a shareholder dispute

  1. What is to be achieved in the end: cooperation, control, exit or complete separation?
  2. Which shareholdings, majorities and special provisions in the articles exist?
  3. Is a shareholder also a managing director, and what does the service agreement provide?
  4. Which information and documents are missing for a reliable assessment?
  5. Which resolutions have been passed or are imminent?
  6. Are there redemption, assignment, withdrawal, deadlock, severance or arbitration provisions?
  7. What is the shareholding worth economically, and how can a separation be financed and implemented for tax purposes?

Anyone who can answer these questions has turned a personal conflict back into a structured commercial law problem. That is the prerequisite for a controlled solution.

Shareholder disputes & corporate litigation

We support shareholders, companies and managing directors from the strategic assessment through to a contentious or amicable solution.

  • Analysis of the articles of association and side agreements
  • Enforcing and defending against information rights
  • Preparing contentious shareholders’ meetings
  • Reviewing prohibitions on voting, majorities and resolutions
  • Disputes over defective resolutions and interim relief
  • Dismissal of and separation from managing directors
  • Redemption, compulsory assignment and exclusion of shareholders
  • Minority protection and 50/50 deadlocks
  • Enforcing claims under corporate law and against managing directors
  • Negotiating amicable shareholder exits
  • Business valuation, severance and tax structuring
  • Drafting the final separation agreement

Our approach is not to escalate corporate conflicts by reflex. We clarify legal positions and economic interests, secure the company’s ability to act and develop a strategy from this that combines negotiation, corporate law, tax law and, where necessary, enforcement in court.

Shareholder disputes & corporate litigation

Strategy. Negotiation. Enforcement.

Request an initial consultation ↗

Frequently asked questions

No. A compulsory redemption requires a corresponding basis in the articles under Section 34 GmbHG. In addition, judicial exclusion for good cause may be considered under narrow conditions. Exclusion remains a last resort.

This article provides a general overview for information purposes only and does not replace advice on individual cases. As of: 25 October 2026.

Would you like us to assess your situation?

Briefly describe your matter. We will get back to you within one business day with an initial assessment.